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ABSTRACT
Few empirical studies of the economics of crime have doubted
the deterrent effects of the legal sanctions on crime. Those
studies, however, have not established a definitive understand-
ing of the effects of labor market conditions on crime. In
this paper, we examine the impact of labor market conditions,
represented by either male civilian unemployment or labor force
participation rates, on seven major categories of crime, using
the quarterly crime-rate data for the United States.
Based on an analysis of the reported crime rates for murder,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny—
theft, and motor vehicle theft during the period from the first
quarter of 1970 through the fourth quarter of 1983, we reject
the null hypothesis that labor market conditions have no effects
on the crime rate. Rather, we find that the male civilian
unemployment rates, especially the rate for those twenty-five
years old and over, are strongly and positively associated
with most of the crime rates studied. The male civilian labor
force participation rates are also found to be related to the
crime rates considered here. Youth labor force participation
rates for both whites and non—whites, sixteen to nineteen years
old, are more strongly associated with the examined crime rates
than are the labor force participation rates for males, twenty
years old and over. Tadashi Yarriada
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I. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Becker [3], there has been, in
studies of the economics of crime, a considerable amount of
theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of legal
sanctions on criminal activities (e.g., Block and Heineke [4];
Ehrlich [7) and [8]; Hoenack and Weller [161; Schmidt and
Witte [24]). While most previous empirical studies agree on
the deterrent effects of legal sanctions on crime1, there is yet
to be a definitive statement about the effects of labor market
conditions on the crime rate. The statistical significance and
sign of the unemployment—rate——crime--rate relation surprisingly
vary from one empirical study to another. If there is an
unemployment rate effect on the crime rate, the spillover effect
of the unemployment rate on the crime rate is too important for
the makers of public policy to ignore. Therefore, the empirical
relationships between labor market conditions and the crime rate
deserve more careful attention and clarification.
There are, in our opinion, two major drawbacks to previous
empirical studies of the crime rate and labor market conditions.
First, most of the empirical models did not allow for the lagged
effects of the unemployment rate on the crime rate.2 One can
easily discover from the crime—rate data for the last decades
that the crime rate has had cyclical and lagged behavior, varying
over the business cycles. We will show that this lag specification—2—
is significant. Second, it is not likely that the models are
free of a strong multicollinearity between the unemployment rate
and other explanatory variables, e.g., income distribution and
wages. Unemployment usually affects unskilled workers, minority
groups, and secondary workers, and thereby exacerbates income
inequality. A given level of unemployment rate is likely to
influence not only the rate of change, but also the level of
wage rates in the labor market. In our view, a lag specification
on the unemployment rate variable and multicollinearity between
the unemployment rate and other explanatory variables in a crime
supply function are primarily responsible for the inconclusive
empirical results in past analyses of the unemployment—rate——
crime—rate relation.
The purpose of this study is to re-examine the relationships
between the unemployment rate (and, the labor force participation
rate) and the crime rate by using a different methodology from
that used in most previous empirical studies. We apply time
series techniques developed by Granger [13] and Sims [25] to
quarterly time series data on the male civilian unemployment and
labor force participation rates and the rates of seven categories
of crime: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny—theft, and motor vehicle theft. An application
of the time series methodology is intuitively appealing as a way
of analyzing the significance and sign of the unemployment effects
on these crime rates as well as the timing of changes in these
crime rates in response to changes in labor market conditions.—3—
The period of analysis for this study is from the first quarter
of 1970 to the fourth quarter of, 1983 in the United States. There
are a number of reasons why we choose this period for study.
First, during this period, there have been significant fluctua-
tions in male civilian unemployment rates for almost allage
groups, and similarly there have been significant fluctuations in
male civilian labor force participation rates, especially for
youths under the age of twenty. Second, the crime rates mentioned
above all experienced an unprecedentedly rapid rise during this
period, except for the last three years.3 Finally, few empirical
studies on the unemployment—rate——crime—rate relation have covered
the period that we analyze.
The organization of the subsequent sections of this study is
as follows: Section II is a brief review of the previous empirical
findings on the unemployment-rate——crime-rate relation.
Section III describes the time series techniques applied to
observe dynamic relationships between variables in a system.
Section IV reports the empirical results. Finally, Section V
gives the conclusion of this study.II. A Review of the Previous Findings
Changes in labor market conditions alter an individual's
expected earning opportunities from legal market activities.
Smaller opportunity costs due to unemployment would increase the
incentive for an individual to commit a crime as an alternative
pecuniary source and/or some form of psychic gratification.
Despite the plausibility of this argument, both time series and
cross—sectional analyses have found two contrasting empirical
interpretations of the relationships between the unemployment
rate and the crime rate.
First, time series analyses of the unemployment—rate——crime—
rate relation for the United States display a wide variation in
their findings. Fleisher [9] found the effect of the male
civilian unemployment rate on juvenile delinquency to be positive
and significant using data from Boston, Cincinnati, and Chicago
combined, and from Boston alone, over the period from 1936 to
1956. In the same study, Fleisher also found a similar result
for the aggregated U.S. data for the period from 1932 to l96l.
Contrary to the Fleisher findings, an analysis by Danziger
and Wheeler [6] of the aggregate U.S. data during the period
from 1947 to 1970 showed no significant unemployment rate effects
on property crimes such as robbery5 and burglary except its
significantly negative impact on assault. Similarly, Land and
Felson [17] rejected unemployment rate effects on property and
violent crimes for the sample period from 1947 to 1972.—5—
Supporting a view that murder is often a by—product of crimes
involving material gain, Ehrlich [8], using the U.S. annual data
for the period between 1933 and 1969, reported a significantly
positive unemployment rate effect on murder. However, by re-
examining a sample period similar to Ehrlich's, Hoenack and
Weiler [16] reported that neither unemployment nor labor force
participation rates have statistically significant effects on
murder-rates and consequently rejected the Ehrlich findings.
Since a labor—force—participation-rate——crime--rate relation
appears, in general, statistically stronger than an unemployment—
rate——crime—rate relation in time series studies, Freeman [11]
claims that "...thosewho leave the labor force are the most
crime prone (p. 10)." This view is strongly supported by the
evidence that labor market opportunities measured by labor force
participation rates are the major factor for explaining the
increasing property crime rates for youths for the period from
1953 to 1967 in the United States (Phillips, et al. [21]).
Also, Ehrlich [7] indicates that the labor force participation
rate could represent an index of the total time spent in legi-
timate market activities.
Second, cross—sectional analyses of the unemployment—rate——
crime—rate relation are inconclusive on the unemployment rate
effect. Fleisher [10] found the male civilian unemployment rate
to be a cause of juvenile delinquent behavior in the seventy—
four census-tract communities in the city of Chicago and in the
forty—five suburbs of Chicago in Cook County, for the years
between 1958 and 1961 (Also, see Allison [1], who made a similar—6—
finding using 1960 data from Chicago and its surrounding cornmu—
nities.) However, Weicher [29] indicated that the Fleisher
results depended heavily on the choice of the variables which
represent tastes for jouvenile delinquency in the Fleisher
regressions. In fact, in Weicher's regressions, the male civilian
unemployment rates are statistically insignificant and sometimes
even statistically negative.
In Ehrlich's analysis of property and violent crime rates for
1960 across the United States, the variable of the unemployment
rate of civilian urban males, ages fourteen to twenty—four, has
virtually no effect on the crime rate (Ehrlich [71). The study
found statistically significant labor-force—participation—rate——
crime—rate relation: positive effects on the larceny and auto
theft rates and negative effects on the murder and rape rates.6
Ehrlich [7] gives two reasons why the unemployment rate
variable is not significant at all. First, the unemployment
rate among the age group from fourteen to twenty—four is predo-
minantly voluntary unemployment due to the search for desirable
employment. Second, the variables for the unemployment rate
and income inequality (measured by the percentage of families
below one—half of median income) are highly correlated with
each other in the regressions since an increase in unemployment
rates is likely to aggravate income inequality by dispropor-
tionately affecting those people with lower schooling and job
experiences.
Using data from fifty-three municipalities with 1960 popula-
tions ranging from 25,000 to 200,000, Sjoquist [26] found a—7—
significantly positive effect of the unemployment rate on
property crime rates (combining robbery, burglary, and larceny
rates) in 1968. Sjoquist assumes that an unemployed person
has less income than a normally employed person and would
have more incentive to commit crimes than an employed one
because the former has more time to allocate to illegitimate
activities. Hoch [15] and Bechdolt [2] support the Sjoquist
fj.nding: Hoch uses 1960 and 1970 combined data from Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (hereafter, SMSAs) while Bechdolt
studies data drawn from Los Angeles census tracts for 1960
and from Chicago police districts for 1970. Although these
three studies strongly support the unemployment—rate——crime—rate
relation, it is worth noting that other analyses of SMSAs negate
these relationships (e.g., see Danziger and Wheeler [6]; Pogue
[23])
Finally, with respect to analyses that use individual data,
which have the great advantage of focusing on individual choices
between legitimate and illegitimate activities, we also find
two conflicting results. Witte [30] found extremely weak rela-
tionships between labor market conditions and the crime rate
by examining the post-release activities of a random sample of
641 men who were in prison in North Carolina in 1969 or 1971.
On the contrary, Myers [201 found the opposite result, based on
a sample of 432 males released in 1971—1972 from Maryland's
state prisons to the Baltimore area.
We notice that, so far, the empirical results of these studies
of the unemployment—rate——crime-rate relation are still ambiguous—8—
and highly sensitive to the specification of a crime supply
function. To clarify this anthiguity and overcome this sensi—
tivity, we will propose a quasi-reduced form of a crime model
in the following section.7—9—
III. Statistical Model
In this section, we illustrate the statistical methodology
used in our analysis of the unemployment (and, labor force
participation) —rate——crime-rate relation.
Assume a particular crime rate observed at time t, Y(t), has
two components:
Y(t) =Y(t)+ Yc(t) (1)
where Y andrepresentnormal and cyciical components, res-
pectively. The normal component Y would be explained in a
structural model, which includes a crime supply function, the
production functions of the probabilities of arrest, of con-
viction, and of punishment, and public expenditure functions
(e.g., Greenwood and Wadycki [14]; Hoenack and Weiler [16]).
Here we assume that the lagged crime rate in question, Y,
another related, lagged crime rate, Y*, and trend T capture
the normal component n' while the lagged unemployment rate Ti
represents the cyclical component
In a vector autoregressive model, we will have a vector auto-
regressive representation (hereafter, VAR) as follows:
Y(t) =A(L)Y(t)+ B(L)Y*(t) + C(L)U(t) + hT + e(t) (2)
and
U(t) =D(L)Y(t)+ F(L)y*(t) + G(L)U(t) + h'T + e'(t), .....(3)
where A(•), B(•), C(s), D(-), F(.), and G(.) are distributed lag
coefficients; L is a lag operator, defining L1Y(t) =Y(t—l);and— 10—
hand h' are the coefficients on trend T, reflecting individual's
allegiance to societal norms. e and e' in the VAR are random
variables, i.e., residuals, which are called the innovations in
crime rate Y and unemployment rate U, respectively, in the VAR
analysis. The innovations, e and e', are assumed white noise
with no contemporaneous, as well as lagged, correlation with each
other.
An estimation of equation (3) simultaneously with equation (2)
in the VAR, will make it statistically possible to simulate future
responses in the crime rate in question, Y, to random shocks in
the innovation in unemployment rate, U.In a theoretical sense,
a rationale for equation (3) can be found in Witte [30]: "...
lowquality jobs are readily available to ex—offenders, but higher
quality jobs are more difficult to encounter... [the unemployment
rate] becomes a variable endogenous to the system and simultaneous
equations methods should be used to estimate the model (p. 80)
To test whether the current crime rate in question, Y(t),can
be predicted by the past unemployment rates, the null hypothesis
is set that C(•) in equation (2) should be zero if there is no
Granger—causality from the unemployment rate to the crime rate.9
Since the estimated distributed lag coefficients for C() include
complicated cross—equation feedbacks, the sumofthe estimated
C() does not yield a total impact of the unemployment rate on the
crime rate. Sims [25] suggests estimating a moving average
representation (hereafter, MAR) instead, in order to observe
responses in the crime rate to the unemployment rate.
A particular i—th equation, e.g., a murder equation, in the— 11—
MARinvertedfrom the aforementioned VAR is shown as:
q k
Murder(t) = m.(s) e. (t—s) ,..... (4)
j=l s=O
where "q" is the number of the variables in thesystem.In
equation (4), the sum of m.(s) from s=O to s=k, e.g., the j—th
component of ethe innovation in male civilian unemployment
rate for those sixteen to seventeen years old (U1617),repre-
sents the cumulative responses of the murder rate in the k+l
step-ahead to random shocks in the innovation in U16l7. The
cumulative responses yield the total impact of the unemployment
rate on the murder rate.1°— 12—
IV.EmpiricalResults
The variables in this study are quarterly data for the United
States. The b.ehavior of seven different crime rates is analyzed
over the period from the first quarter of 1970 through the fourth
quarter of 1983: murder (MURD), forcible rape (RAPE), robbery
(ROBB), aggravated assault (ASSA), burglary (BURG), larceny-
theft (LARC), and motor vehicle theft (AUTO).11
The unemployment rate variable assumes male civilian unemploy-
ment rates for those sixteen to seventeen years old (U1617),
eithteen to nineteen years old (U1819), twenty to twenty—four
years old (U2024), and twenty—five years old and over (U25).
On the other hand, in an analysis of the labor—force—partici-
pation—rate——crime—rate relation, the labor force participation
rate variable assumes male civilian labor force participation
rates for whites, sixteen to nineteen years old (WL1619) and
twenty years old and over (WL2O), and for non-whites, sixteen to
nineteen years old (NWL1619) and twenty years old and over
(NWL2O)
12
The system in a vector autoregressive model consists of four
unemployment (or labor force participation) rates, and two crime
rates, variables, all of which are expressed in logarithms. The
lag length in the variables is assumed to be the same, i.e.,
four lag distributions, based on our preliminary work. A parti-
cular crime rate equation in the VAR includes a constant, time
trend, three seasonal dummies, four own lags, four lags of
another related crime rate, and four lags each of U1617, Ul8l9,
U2024, and TJ25 (or wL1619, WL2O, NWL1619, and NWL2O).'3 We,— 13—
therefore,estimate twenty—nine regression coefficients in one
equation in a system consisting of six equations.
Given the four lag distributions for each of the male civilian
unemployment rate variables, we performed the Granger—causality
tests to examine if the unemployment rate variables have the
explanatory power to predict the behavior of the crime rate
dependent variable. Table 1—1 presents the F-statistics on the
unemployment rate variables: U25, 1J2024, Ul819, and U1617. The
results indicate that the effect of the male civilian unemployment
rate for those twenty—five years old and over (U25) is pronounced
and is statistically significant in explaining the behavior of all
the crime rates except the larceny-theft rate (LARC).
[Table 1-li
The robust relationships between U25 and the various crime rates
would indicate that high unemployment rates among this age group
are largely due to involuntary unemployment, which causes the
individual male or his family to feel insecure and reduces the
acquisition of market goods and services with legitimate family
earnings. These circumstances would increase the incentive to
commit crimes.
The results for the male civilian unemployment rates among
youths, e.g., among those sixteen to seventeen years old (U16l7)
and those eighteen to nineteen years old (U1819), are relatively
disappointing. The weak association between the unemployment rate
among youths and the crime rate, however, conforms with previous
findings, supporting the view that the unemployment rate among— lL—
teenagergroups is predominantly voluntary unemployment due to
the search for desired employment.
Table 1—2 reports the cumulative responses of the various
crime rates four, eight, and twelve quarters ahead to a one
standard deviation shock in the innovation in U25. That is,
the cumulative responses show the total impacts from the
unemployment rate on the crime rate for the different quarters
ahead. We find that the impact of U25 on all crime rates is
unambiguously positive at all time horizons shown except for the
eight and twelve quarters ahead for the motor vehicle theft rate
(AUTO). The predominantly positive association strongly supports
the position that an increase in the unemployment rateamong the
prime—age males (twenty—five years old and over) will necessarily
raise the overall crime rate in the society.
[Table 1—2]
In terms of "marginal" responses in the crime rate fromquarter
to quarter in Table 1-2, we note that themarginal cumulative
responses in most of the crime rates reach their maximums within
four or eight quarters ahead. Forexample, the marginal responses
in the murder rate (MURD) are 1.06 for thefirst four quarters
ahead and 0.16 (=1.22—1.06) for the second fourquarters ahead.
In other words, an increase in MURD due toa rise in U25 is
mostly realized within the first four quarters ahead,i.e., one
year. We can find similar results for all other crime rates
except the larceny—theft rate (LARC).— 15—
Ininterpreting the numerical results of the cumulative res-
ponses in Table 1—2, when U25 is about 0.5 percent (this value
is not reported but is obtained from the estimated matrix of the
moving average coefficients) higher than forecast on the basis
of past data, the effect on MURD four quarters ahead is an increase
of 1.06 percent, 1.22 percent increase eight quarters ahead, and
1.20 percent increase twelve quarters ahead. The other numerical
values of each crime rate for the corresponding quarters ahead
can be read in a similar manner, but those values are associated
with an increase of 0.4 percent of
Although not reported in the tables, the results of the decom-
position of variance of each crime rate, due to a one standard
deviation shock in the innovation in U25, also confirm the
importance of U25 in explaining the behavior of the crime rates.
The innovation in U25 accounts for roughly 20 to 30 percent of the
variance of each crime rate four or eight quarters ahead and the
proportions accounted for decay thereafter.15
Table 2—1 lists the F-statistics on the male civilian labor
force participation rate variables--WL2O, NWL2O, WL1619, and
NWL1619--based on the Granger-causality tests. We note the
importance of the labor force participation rate of whites, six-
teen to nineteen years old (WLl6l9), and that of non-whites, six-
teen to nineteen years old (NWL1619), in predicting the behavior
of the various crime rates. It is quite noteworthy that NWL1619
Granger-causes most of the crime rates: MURD, ROBB, ASSA, BURG,
and AUTO. These statistically prominent associations between— 16—
theyouth labor force participation rates and the various crime
rates suggest that youth labor force participation rates ref lect—
ing labor market opportunities are the major indices for measuring
the total time that youths have available for illegitimate activi-
ties.
[Tables 2-1 and 2—2]
Table 2—2 reports the cumulative responses in the rates of the
seven categories of crime to a one standard deviation shock in the
innovation in NWL1619. The responses in the crime rates are pre-
dominantly negative for the various quarters ahead considered.
That is, a fall in the labor force participation rate of non-whites,
sixteen to nineteen years old (NWL1619), triggers all the crime
rates to rise various quarters ahead. Our findings, therefore,
strongly support Freeman's claim that youths who leave the labor
market are the most crime prone (Freeman [11]).— 17—
V.Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the impact of labor market
conditions on crime in a vector autoregressive model. In the
analysis of the rates of seven different crimes——murder, forcible
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny—theft, and
motor vehicle theft-—over the period from the first quarter of
1970 through the fourth quarter of 1983, we rejected the null
hypothesis that labor market conditions have no effects on crime
.L. citt .
Themale civilian unemployment rates, especially the rate for
those twenty—five years old and over, are strongly associated
with most of the crime rates studied. An increase in the
unemployment rate of those twenty—five years old and over
clearly triggers a subsequent increase in all the crime rates,
whose peaks are reached within a few years. The definite
spillover effects of the unemployment rate on the various crime
rates suggest that a carefully designed implementation of general
macroeconomic policies aimed at reducing unemployment rates would
contribute to reducing crime rates. This, however, does not
imply that legal sanctions on crime might not be more effective.
The male civilian labor force participation rates are also
found to be related to the crime rates considered here. Youth
labor force participation rates for both whites and non—whites,
sixteen to nineteen years old, are more strongly associated with
the examined crime rates than are the labor force participation
rates for males, twenty years old and over. The complexity of— 18—
ourindustrial society requires youths more to obatin formal
education and more specialized training for jobs. The predomi-
nantly negative impact of the youth labor force participation
rates on the crime rates suggests that publically subsidized
vocational programs for youth dropouts from both school and the
labor market help keep their time occupied, and that alone will
consequently reduce the juvenile crime rate. Also, a subminimum
wage (one below the statutory minimum wage) and a new job tax
credit may have significant crime reducing effects. Expanding
job opportunities for youths should be considered as equally
important as the deterrent effects of the legal sanctions on
crime in order to reduce the overall crime rate in the society.N-i
Notes
*Iam indebted to Michael Grossman, Bernard Okun, Paul Goldberg,
and Tetsuji Yamada for their helpful comments on the first draft of
this paper. The opinions expressed in this paper, as well asany
errors, are mine.
1. Some of the deterrent effects are due to changes in the
probabilities of arrest, of conviction, and of punishment, and
also to changes in the severity of punishment.
2. The cross—sectional analyses are assumed to be based on a
sample in long run equilibrium and consequently provide no infor-
mation on the unemployment rate's lagged effects on the crime rate.
3. From 1980 to 1983, the notable rate reductions were among
murder (a 19 percent reduction), robbery (a 14 percent reduction),
burglary (a 21 percent reduction), and motor vehicle theft (a 114
percent reduction), based on the annual crime rates per 100,000
inhabitants (United States [28)).
4. Concerning an unemployment—rate——crime—rate relation in
foreign countries, Wolpin [31; 32] found significantly positive
unemployment rate effects on robbery rates for England and Wales
over the period 1894-1967 and also for England and Japan from
1955 to 1971.
5. According to recent Uniform Crime Reports (United States
[28]), published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "violent
crime" includes murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault, while "property crimet' includes burglary, larceny—theft,
and motor vehicle theft. Since robbery used to be classified as
one of the property crime, I have followed the classification inN- 2
the articles which were reviewed.
6. The positive labor force participation rate effect on the
rate of crimes against property and its negative effect on the
rate of crimes against persons are considered to be due to the
scale effect of the participation in criminal activities since
the labor force participation rate is viewed as an index of the
total time spent in legitimate activities (Ehrlich [7], p. 555).
7. Recent studies by Corman, et al. [5], McPhetters, et al.
[19], and Phillips and Ray [22], which used dynamic models of
crime, are noteworthy. Corman, et al., and Phillips and Ray
found dynamic unemployment rate effects on the crime rates, while
McPhetters, et al., who did not incorporate the unemployment rate
in their model, reported that changes in criminal sanctions altered
the structural mixed autoregressive—integrated—moving average
(ARIMA) model of the robbery rate.
8. An abbreviation is used in the text.
9. Granger [13] defines causality between two stationary
stochastic time series, X(t) and Y(t), within a set of information
in the universe as follows: A time series X causes another time
series Y if the current value of Y is more accurately predicted
by using the information that includes at least the own—past series
of Y and the past series of X, than by using the information that
excludes the past series of X.
10. If the innovations in variables are contemporaneously
correlated with each other, it is not possible to partition the
variance of the crime rate, e.g., murder rate, into piecesN- 3
accounted for by each innovation. An orthogonalization for the
innovations in the variables in the MAR is, therefore, made after
a triangularization of the system. See Gordon and King [12],
Litterman [18], and Sims [25] for details.
11. These data are relative crime rates obtained from the
Uniform Crime Reports for the United States (United States [28]).
The four observations for each of the seven crime rates in 1969
are estimated by using the corresponding data from 1970 to 1980.
12. The data are obtained from United States [27].
13. The adapted lag distribution is not entirely arbitrary
since the additional lag distribution can be tested. In fact,
our preliminary work shows no significant improvement in the
F-statistics on the additional lag distributions for more than
four lags.
14. The estimated cumulative responses are one—tenth smaller
than those values reported in Tables 1—2 and 2-2. As long as
the interpretation is made in terms of percentages, there is no
qualitative change. See Litterman [18] for the interpretation.
15. The decomposition of variance in the crime rate measures
the degree of interaction between the crime rate and the unemploy-
ment rate. A formula of the decomposition of variance can be
found in Litterman [18], p. 79.R- 1
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Granger—Causality Test
F-Statistics on Male Civilian Unemployment Ratea
1970(I) —1983(IV)
Dependent Variable
Independent MURD RAPE ROBB ASSA BURG LARC AUTO
Variable
u25 2.553* 2.558* 6.330***5.653***3.153** .4746.519***
U2024 1.909 .6333973** 2.202* 1.4101.9301.418
U1819 .652 .842 .6471.179 .4062.327* 2.833**
U1617 2.668* 1.100 .302 .655 .6204.236*** .312
a the degrees of freedom =(4,25)
*Significantat =10% **Significantat =5%
***Significantat =1%
Table 1—2
Cumulative Responses of Crime K Quarters Ahead to an Initial
One-Standard-Deviation Shock in Innovation in Male Civilian
Unemployment Rate for Those 25 Years Old and Over (U25)
Dependent Variable
Quarters MURD RAPE ROBB ASSA BURG LARC AUTO
Ahead
4 1.06 .47 .79 .31 .65 .49 .34
8 1.22 .43 .89 .26 1.02 1.23 —.04
12 1.20 .33 1.08 .14 1.08 .96 —.07Table 2—1
Granger-Causality Test
F—Statistics on Male Civilian Labor Force Participation Ratea
1970(I) —1983(IV)
Dependent Variable
Independent MURD RAPE ROBB ASSA BURG LARC AUTO
Variable
WL2O 1.6882.545* 1.8293.560** .432 .723 .659
NWL2O 1.445 .893 .8941.3551.305 .8491.101
WL1619 3.421** 4.505*** .3122.677*3.182 .4591.638
NWL1619 2.457* 1.8533.090** 2.860** 2.967** 1.0043.098**
a the degrees of freedom =(4,25)
*Significantat a.= 10%**Significantat =5%
Significant at =1%
Table 2-2
Cumulative Responses of Crime K Quarters Ahead to
an Initial One—Standard—Deviation Shock in Innovation
in Male Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate of
Non-whites, 16 to 19 Years Old (NWL1619)
Dependent Variable
Quarters MURD RAPE ROBB ASSA BURG LARC AUTO
Ahead
4 —.39 —.13 —.26 —.07 —.24 —.47 —.08
8 —.60 —.22 —.38 —.10 —.31 —.41 .12
12 —.71 —.18 —.43 —.04 —.15 —.02